Introduction: Review of the Literature
The unemployment of young people (less than 25 years of age) is not new. It first became a focus of labour market research and government policies in the crisis of the 1970s (Clark and Summers 1978; OECD 1980; Lynch and Richardson 1982) . The present crisis put the problem of the most vulnerable groups, among them the youth of the labour market, in focus in Europe and globally as well (Verick 2009 (Verick , 2010 Scarpetta, Sonnet, and Manfredi 2010; Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli 2011; Dietrich 2012) . Looking at the present and remembering the 1970s and 1980s when the youth joblessness crisis was similar, Bell and Blanchflower (2010) state that it feels like déjà vu.
Although youth unemployment has an extended literature, the problem gains special attention in periods of recession. The first analysis during the crisis of the 1970s concluded that youth employment and unemployment have a pronounced cyclical character (Clark and Summers 1978; O'Higgins 1997) ; others found that the youth unemployment problem goes beyond cyclical changes and other factors such as wages, education and experience play a role in the longer term trends (Freeman and Wise 1980; Rice 1986; Ghellab 1998; Korenman and Neumark 2000; Carmeci and Mauro 2003; Caroleo and Pastore 2007) . This shift of attention to institutions or "labour market rigidities" gained strength in the 1990s (Blanchard 2006) . In this aspect, the inefficiency of partial labour market reforms have been revealed as well (e.g. Blanchard and Landier 2001) Some papers have taken a more general view when digging down for the reasons of youth unemployment. Decades ago, Clark and Summers stated that "the lack of desirable employment opportunities is the crux of the problem for those most seriously affected by youth unemployment (Clark and Summers 1978, 2) ." Similarly, O'Higgins (2001) emphasised that youth unemployment is a reflection of a country's poor macroeconomic performance and that the argument that the major cause of youth unemployment is the absence of the right skills and attitudes within the young generation is only partly true, as the real reason is that society has failed to create enough jobs for them. Still he does not go beyond the institutional frames and suggests moving towards a more demand-oriented strategy based on social partnership by including workers' and employers' organisations in tackling the problem. The Manpower Group (2012) suggests promoting economic growth, entrepreneurship development and education among other things.
Although the results of research presented a rich palette of reasons for and implications of youth unemployment, education and training gained predominance as the first cause and hence the best remedy for the joblessness of the youth. It is especially true for the policy and recommendations of the European Commission.
The phenomenon which we call now NEETs (unemployed persons who are not in education or training) also appeared decades ago, albeit indirectly, as a result of the demotivation of young people with regard to doing formal wage jobs and integrating into society (Clark and Summers 1978) . O'Higgins (2001) draws the attention to the fact that high levels of youth unemployment are likely to lead to alienation and social unrest. Korenman and Neumark (2000, 97) realise the strong connection between adult and youth unemployment. They claim that "youth unemployment rates are much more responsive to general labour market improvements than to declines in cohort size" and that a return to low adult unemployment rates can improve youth labour markets.
Although the predominant opinion is that youth unemployment tends to grow faster than adult unemployment, not all researches confirm this result. This is due to differences in methods used. Several studies build on the analysis of the variations in unemployment rates measured in percentage points. O'Higgins (2001) explains why this is not adequate to describe the relative 184
A. ARTNER importance of youth unemployment. Although the variations in youth unemployment rates are much larger than variations in adult unemployment rates, the two variations are proportional to one another as the youth unemployment rate is always higher than the adult unemployment rate. He states that the youth unemployment rate and adult unemployment rates are proportional in the long run. In this article, we follow O'Higgins' line and analyse proportional changes instead of the changes measured in percentage points.
In spite of extensive research results, youth unemployment is still seen mostly as a particular problem. In this article, I intend to reinforce those arguments that are seemingly ignored partly by the mainstream literature and definitely by the European socio-economic policies concerning the character of the youth unemployment as consequence of other things and suggest that its mitigation is not possible without offering a solution to the general problem of the historically increasing unemployment, the reason of which lies in the laws of competition for profit.
The Framework of the Study
This study aims at contributing to the better identification of the problem of youth unemployment through extending the scope of the analysis.
In my opinion, youth unemployment is not the most acute problem of the European labour market. I intend to prove this step by step beginning with the analysis of unemployment data that demonstrate that the unemployment of older people is even more serious. I also detect that in the last decade the relative importance of youth unemployment increased more in the developed countries of the EU than in the CEEC or in the euro-crisis countries. We continue by broadening the scope of the investigation with NEETs. I will point out that even this phenomenon is not the differentia specifica of the youth: it characterises older generations too.
I use a "three dimensional" method of analysis. As a first aspect, I examine the given problem (active youth unemployment as a take-off point) in a moment that means here a short-term period since the crises. Then, I compare the given problem with other aspects (the unemployment of older generations and NEETs). As a third aspect, but simultaneously applied momentum, I study the tendencies of examined variables by using long-term data when available.
The article builds up as follows. In Chapter 3, I identify the youth unemployment and NEETs problem. In Chapter 4, I place youth unemployment in the context of general unemployment. First I demonstrate the inferiority of the youth unemployment relative to the problem of unemployment in general (Section 4.1 and 4.2). I then go on with the analysis of the young and adult NEETs (Section 4.3 and 4.4 
Youth Unemployment in the EU at a First Glance
Youth unemployment has several direct reasons, but in contemporary Europe the most frequently mentioned one is the unpreparedness of young people to enter the labour market. The reason is that Europe is in a period of Schumpeterian "creative destruction" that leads to a new economic system with new structures based on new technologies. However, Europe is not there yet. The structure and level of education are lagging behind instead of leading technological change. From this point of view, the unpreparedness of youth means insufficient knowledge of the youth. The inadequate education they receive means there is a structural mismatch between their skills and the demand of the market. Besides these two factors, but strongly related to them and the NEET-phenomenon, disappointment explains the joblessness of young, even well-educated people to a great extent. Disappointment is the by-product of every crisis, but also the sign of fundamental problems of a given society; what, very naturally, the young people feel at first. In the EU27, the unemployment rate of those less than 25 years of age increased from 15.7% in 2007 to 22.7% in 2012 and reached more than 23% in the first half of 2013. This rate is more than twice as high as the rate of adult unemployment which was less than 9.7% in May 2013.
1
Less than 30% of those unemployed aged 15-24 found a job and 42% of employment contracts of young people were temporary; that is four times higher than in the case of adults. Almost every third young person is working part time, approximately twice the rate of the adults in 2011 (EC 2012a, 4; Eurofound 2012, 14-16) . Although the rate of long-term unemployment 2 -if measured as a percentage of the total number of unemployed in the given age cohort -is lower for those of age 15-24 than for those between 25 and 74 (31.9 and 48.5%, respectively, in 2012Q3), it is much higher if the denominator is the number of the total population in the given age cohort: 7.3% of the young population and 4.3% of the adults were unemployed for 12 months or more in 2012 (EC 2012a, 4). But it is not unemployment itself that makes the problem of youth so severe. The term unemployment conventionally covers only people who are not in education, want to work and actively seek a job but cannot find one. Those are the so-called active unemployed (ILO definition). There is however a large group within the young generation that does not belong to the active unemployed, but is neither in employment nor in education. They, together with the active unemployed (who are not in training), form the group of young people who are called NEETs. The identification of this group originates from the UK in the 1980s and the expression NEET was formally introduced first in 1999 (Eurofound 2012, 20) .
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The Europe 2020 flagship initiative Youth on the Move mentioned the problem as a group of "young people at risk" beyond the active unemployed (EC 2010, 16) . In 2011, in the European Union, there were around 14 million young people of 15-29 years of age out of both education and work, 8.7 million of whom were active unemployed.
There is a difference between the concept of the unemployment rate and the rate of NEETs. The denominator for the unemployment rate is the active population (those who are neither employed nor in education but look for a job actively), while for the rate of NEETs the denominator is the population of the age group. So, whereas the number of NEETs is higher than that of the active unemployed, the rate of the former is lower than that of the latter. So whereas the youth unemployment rate was almost 23%, the rate of NEETs stood at 13.2% for those 15-24-years old and 20.6% for those 25-29-years old in the EU in 2012.
In order to understand the problem of youth unemployment better and to evaluate the youth employment policy of the EU more properly, we have to analyse the situation from several aspects. First, I investigate the youth unemployment rate in the sense of the ILO-definition in the long run. Second, I analyse the change of the absolute magnitude of youth and total unemployment and the relation between these two after the outbreak of the crisis (share of young unemployed -SYU). I compare the SYU to the changes of the relative size of the youth cohort in the total (15-74-years old) population.
After analysing these data (Section 4.1 and 4.2), I will dig into the problem of the NEETs (4.3). In Section 4.4, I flesh out the fundamental roots of youth unemployment and NEETs, which go far beyond the age-cohort differences of the labour market.
The Youth Unemployment Rate
In Section 3, I present data for the sharp increase of youth and general unemployment after 2007. But if we look back in time we find a different trend. In The averages of these groups, however, hide important inner differences. For example, in Spain, youth employment has always been the most fragile segment of the labour market. The rate of unemployment for people less than 25 years of age was above 40% at the time of the Spanish accession to the EU (in 1986) and after a period of decrease this rate jumped to over 40% again in 1993-1994. The youth unemployment rate in Spain was the highest in the EU15 until 1998. Since then, for a decade until the explosion of the crisis, Greece and Italy, then also some Eastern European new member states have taken over the lead from Spain.
In the CEECs, trends are partly similar. Today the Baltic States, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia have higher rates of youth unemployment than at any point in the past one-and-a-half decades. But Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia have already produced rates in the first years of the 2000s that were A. ARTNER close to or even higher than those in any quarters since the beginning of the present crisis.
To sum it up, today youth unemployment rates in most of the EU27 increased after 2008, but the phenomenon and even the level of youth unemployment rates are not new at all.
The Share of Youth Unemployment in Total and Comparatively to the Youth Population Share
In the first quarter of 2008 in the EU27, youth (less than 25-years old) unemployment hit its lowest point in the preceding 10 years by slightly over 4 million persons. Since then it has increased by 39.6% or by more than 1.6 million until the first quarter of 2013. However, the present level (5.6 million in 2013Q1) is higher only by 5-800,000 or approximately 12% than it was in the first half of the 2000s.
On the other hand, the number of unemployed aged more than 25 years has increased much more dynamically than that of the young unemployed and far outstripped not only the best years before the crisis, but also the worst quarter of the 2000s (16.1 million in 2004Q4). Between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1, as a result of the crisis, the number of those aged 25-74-years old who were unemployed swelled by 72% or by 8.7 million.
These data hide differences between the countries. In 2012 in Spain, where youth unemployment rates are among the highest in the EU, there were half a million more young unemployed than before the crisis, but the number for 2012 (945,000) is lower than in 1996 (973,000) or in 1983-1988 and 1993-1995 when there were more than 1 million young unemployed in the country. As a result of the crisis, the number of unemployed who were aged 25-74 years grew much faster (223% between 2008Q1 and 2013Q1) than that of those aged less than 25 years (93% in the same period). This is true also for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, where youth unemployment was not higher at the end of 2012 than it was at the end of the 1990s or in some years of the 1980s. After 2007, in all of the above-mentioned five countries the level of unemployment in general and in the 25-74 age cohort increased faster than the number of young (less than 25) unemployed. Similarly, after 2007, in the CEECs the total number of young unemployed has grown more slowly or at about the same pace as the total number of unemployed. On the other hand, the number of young unemployed increased faster than that of the adult unemployed in the majority of the most developed countries of the EU.
In spite of these, the prevalent opinion is that youth unemployment is more sensitive to crisis than total unemployment or -what is only another relationadult unemployment. (OECD 2008; ILO 2010; Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli 2011; Bell and Blanchflower 2011) . This result stems from the regression analysis of the unemployment rates of different age cohorts on the basis of IS YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT REALLY THE MAJOR WORRY? 189 percentage point changes. This method is, however, problematic. On the one hand, the denominator of the unemployment rate tends to be much less relative to the size of the population of the age cohort in the case of youth than in the case of adults because there are proportionally more young people in education than adults. 6 On the other hand, the use of percentage point changes in unemployment rates in analysis, and as O'Higgins also (2001, 2010) remarks, paints a more dramatic albeit less accurate picture of the relative change in youth unemployment, since the youth unemployment rate is always higher than the adult rate. For this reason, I think the share of young people in total unemployment is a useful additional indicator for understanding the relative importance of youth unemployment in the crises and in the long run. First of all we have to emphasise that the rate of youth unemployment and the share of young people within total unemployment are two different ratios. The former is equal to the number of unemployed per active population (employed plus active unemployed) in the given age cohort, whereas the latter is:
Share of young unemployed (SYU) ¼ Number of young unemployed Number of all unemployed
Looking at the change in the SYU in Europe, the first result that has to be mentioned is that the SYU has decreased in almost all member states of the EU in the present crisis, i.e. between 2008 and 2012. That means that the relative importance of youth unemployment has lessened. The longer term tendencies are also important and paint different pictures of the country groups.
The SYU was 24.3-25.2% in the EU27 between 2000 and 2008. Since 2008 SYU has been continuously decreasing and stood at 21.2% in April 2013, the The decreasing trend of the SYU in total is even more pronounced in the case of Greece and Spain -these countries are well known for their high rate of total and youth unemployment and hence are frequently used to illustrate the severity of youth unemployment (Figure 2 ). Besides, in 2012 almost all CEECs had a smaller share of youth unemployment in total than in 2008, and no CEEC had a higher rate than it had already experienced some time in the last 10-15 years (Figure 3) . Figure 4 shows the percentage point change of the SYU for the 27 members of the EU between the first years of the 2000s and 2012 by country groups (Figure 4) . The SYU decreased first of all in the less developed member states. On the other hand, in eight out of 10 of the most developed member states the youngsters took a higher share in total unemployment in 2012 than 10-12 years ago, in spite of the fact that their share in 2012 was usually lower than in 2008. This follows from the fact that in these countries the unemployment of those aged 25 and over increased more than those of less than 25 years of age. Consequently, in this relative sense, the problem of youth unemployment deteriorated first of all in the more developed member states in the past decade. 
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From the above we can conclude the following.
(1) In the past long decade in the EU27, on average, the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate to the adult unemployment rate was less than one. This coincides with Higgins' (2010) results for the EU in the period from 2005 to 2009 ("the elasticity of the youth unemployment rate to the adult unemployment rate has tended to be less than one", 8) My analysis produced the same result for the OECD average in 1970-2011: in the overwhelming majority of these 32 years the youth unemployment rate increased less (in absolute percentages not in percentage points!) than the general unemployment rate. (2) The SYU shows different pictures in the country groups of the EU27. The SYU has a tendency been declining in the "inner periphery" (in the less developed members) of the Union. The trend is, however, just the opposite in the developed or "core" countries.
The shrinking of young people's share in total unemployment (SYU, 15-24 years of age) may be a result of the decrease of share of youngsters (aged 15-24 years) within the population aged 15-74 years (labour force). For this reason, I examined the relation of these two shares by computing a ratio that I call relative youth unemployment (RYU): 
192
A. ARTNER Relative youth unemployment (RYU) ¼
SYU Proportion of the youth in population
On the aggregate level the relative size of the 15-24 age cohort in population force has been continuously decreasing since 2000 in the EU27. On the other hand, the SYU changed cyclically: increased during years of recovery built on the credit boom before the crisis and fell after 2008. The RYU has changed accordingly: increased before the crisis and then declined. In 2012 the RYU of the EU27 was lower than in any other years looking back over more than a decade ( Figure 5 ).
This relative irrelevance of the cohort sizes coincides with the results of Korenman and Neumark (2000) who examined data for 15 OECD countries in the period 1970-1994 and found that relative youth cohort sizes cannot explain changes in youth unemployment sufficiently: "Youth unemployment rates are much more responsive to general labour market improvements than to declines in cohort size" (97). 
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The EU-average of the RYU hides differences. In 2012 the RYU was lower or the same in the majority of the 18 less developed countries of the EU28 (five euro-crisis countries, 11 CEECs, Malta and Cyprus) than in the last years of the 1990s and/or in the first years of the 2000s.
7 This is true only for two to three countries 8 out of the 10 more developed member states. In other words, in spite of the decrease after 2008, in 2012 the RYU was higher in the majority of the developed member states than at the end of the 1990s and/or the beginning of the 2000s. This result reinforces my earlier conclusion, namely, that the relative importance of youth unemployment increased first of all in the developed EU-members after the end of the 1990s. Youth migration from the lower to the higher income countries may be a possible explanation for this phenomenon. The Spanish case, however, contradicts this hypothesis. Although immigration has been characteristic to Spain in the 2000s, the Spanish RYU has decreased between 1998 and 2012 almost continuously from 2.3 to 1.4. A more possible explanation is the growing participation of youth in third-level education in the "inner periphery" of the Union. All in all a farther investigation is needed to explain the different paths of the RYU in different country groups of the EU.
The special attention that youth unemployment has gained in the past few years is not satisfactorily justified on the ground of the above data, since the unemployment of adults is a more serious issue than that of the youth. But, this is not the end of the investigation of the problem of youth joblessness. 
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A. ARTNER Up until now I have examined "active" unemployment (ILO definition). Joblessness, however, is not the same. The number of "discouraged" or "disengaged" people who are not on the labour market is on the rise and among them youngsters seem to be overrepresented. In the next section I will detail this problem.
The Genesis and Challenge of NEETs
The crisis put unemployment into the limelight. However, as we see from the above, the crisis aggravated and rendered acute the already existing problems of the European labour market, but did not generate them. This is true for unemployment in general and for its special characteristics too. For example, the problem of NEETs has already appeared long before the crisis, although not in continental Europe. As we mentioned earlier, the phenomenon was already discovered in the UK in the 1980s, but as a crucial problem, affecting several countries, was identified in Latin America as the "nini" ("ni estudia ni trabaja"-neither studying nor working) generation in the 1990s. At the end of that decade, in Latin-America more than 20% of young people were outside school and without a job according to the ILO (Diez de Medina 2001, 48). Almost half of them did not even seek a job, i.e. belonged to the "ni estudian, ni trabajan, ni buscan trabajo" ("neither studying, nor working, nor wanting to work") group, or to the NEET (Filgueira and Fuentes 2001, 19) .
In the crisis hit-Europe, the phenomenon first became apparent as a Spanish, then as a Greek "peculiarity", but as unemployment in the EU was on the rise and proved to be persistent, the attention turned to the issue of youth unemployment in general; especially because the first fire-fighting measures of the governments aimed to maintain employment. Less attention was devoted to job creation which is of the utmost importance for the new entrants to the labour market, among them first of all youngsters. Thus, the youth employment rate decreased much faster than that of the other age groups. Between 2008 and 2012, the youth employment rate dropped from 37.3 to 32.9%. In the same period, the employment of those between 25 and 54 years of age decreased only from 79.5 to 77.2%, while the employment rate of the 55-64 years age group increased.
An additional problem that -similarly to all the other problems of the labour market -is not new but made the situation even worse is the insufficient rate of participation in education of those in the 15-24 years of age group. This rate grew fast between 1998 and 2005. But, probably, all these numbers would not be sufficient to get the attention of politicians in the absence of mass youth protests against the austerity measures (among them the increase of tuition fees).
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Unlike (active) youth unemployment, in the less developed member states, the NEETs problem is more severe than in the more developed member states. The 10 most developed member states 10 have a diminishing share in the total number of NEETs in the Union with 35.3% in 2011.
11
As far as the longer term trends of NEETs are concerned, Eurostat provides data back to 2000. Figure 6 shows that in 2012 the rate of NEETs was about the same in the 20-34 age cohort and smaller in the 15-19 age cohort as at the beginning of the 2000s. The boom in the middle of the 2000s fed by the financial bubble decreased the rate -as it decreased the rate of unemployment in general -but the crisis re-established the previous conditions.
All this leads to the conclusion that it is the NEET-phenomenon instead of conventional youth (active) unemployment that poses a threat to the European labour market and to the European society in general. The threat to the society stems from the following.
First, it is well known that young people are easier to dismiss because of the temporary and other less safe or "precarious" forms of their employment and they, as new entrants, find jobs in a shrinking labour market with more difficulty. This makes them feel they have no perspectives and have nothing to lose. Second, due to decreasing jobs and changing technologies, employment increasingly depends upon skills and knowledge that correspond to the specific and immediate needs of companies. This means that new entrants have to surrender their life -their personal wishes, dreams, talent etc. -increasingly to the needs of the "labour market", or, more directly speaking, to the "profit- 
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A. ARTNER ability" of firms. If they want to subsist, they have to earn money in deteriorating social circumstances as the welfare state has gradually been dismantled since the 1980s. The price of their subsistence is giving up their ideals in a wider sense. They have to be wage earners as the "market" i.e. profitability requires, instead of having the possibility to live and work as they would like to. What is more, depressed wages allow them little room to manoeuvre between wage-work and self-realisation. This makes youth disappointed and angry and inspires them to turn away from or even against the society. Third, youngsters have fewer social responsibilities as they have usually no children, property or social position to fear for. As a consequence, they give way to their dissatisfaction and anger more easily. They are among the first who are ready to protest, fight, occupy, insist upon their demands or pursue a more "dangerous" life. Disappointed youngsters are jeopardising the status quo. This is obvious if we think of movements that arose in the last 5 years of the crisis in Europe and also in America (see e.g. Afatsawo 2011; Huffington 2011; Karimi and Sterling 2011; Sassen 2011) . Young people are not identical with the unsatisfied protesting mass at all, but they are the engine of the protests, as they were in 1968. They are going to play a more significant role in articulating the indignation of the unemployed and underpaid or indebted population, especially in countries where austerity measures seem to be never ending and/or the institutions and culture of democratic interest representation are not developed enough. This is the case not only in countries like Greece or Spain but also in the CEECs where the mobilisation ability of traditional trade unions and grassroots civil organisations is rather weak.
For 2011, Eurofound presented maps that show the density and activity of NEETs by countries (Mascherini 2012) . The proportion of NEETs is very high in Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ireland and high in UK and Latvia. The political and social engagement of the NEETs is highest in the most crisis-hit Eurozone members, namely Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.
The Labour Market in General -NEETs are all Around
It has to be stressed that the underlying reason behind the disengagement and exclusion from the society of an increasing part of young people is the generally high unemployment. There have never been so many people without a job in Europe as there are today. Since 2009, in the EU15 the level of unemployment has been higher than it was at its peak after the WWII. Then, in 1994, it was 17.7 million or 10.5%. In the EU15 unemployment reached 20.6 million (10.6%) in 2012 and 22.3 million (11.5%) in March 2013. 12 As for the EU27, the figures far outstrip the worst year (2004) since 2000 for which data are available. In 2012, there were 25.3 million unemployed, 4.1 million more than in 2004. In 2012, the rate of unemployment in the EU27 reached 10.5%, whereas it stood at 9.3% in 2004.
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And here we can deepen the analysis of the problem by investigating the rate of NEETs in the older generation. Eurostat does not give data for that, so I made calculations on the basis of other Eurostat data to estimate the NEETrate of the adult population.
14 The results are summarised in Table 1 .
From the data we can conclude the following:
Between 2007 and 2011 the rate of NEETs increased among young people and decreased in the adult population. Apart from the 15-19-year-age group, the majority of whom are in compulsory education, the rate of NEETs is lowest in the 35-54-year-old age cohort and the highest in the 55-64-year-age group. Among the younger cohorts those aged from 25 to 34 years have the highest NEETs rate. This is the life period when youngsters should start a family. The YGS of the European Commission aims at the 15-24-year age cohort only.
The most important conclusion is, however, that there are numerous NEETs in the adult population too and there is not such a big difference among age groups regarding NEETs rates as regarding unemployment rates. Whereas the youth unemployment rate is more than twice as high as the adult unemployment rate, there is only a few percentage points difference in the NEETs rates (except for the 15-19-year-age cohort again, where the rate of NEETs is the lowest because of education). On the ground of the above data, there were 37 to 39 million NEETs in the 35-64 years of age cohort and their number was approximately 23 million in the most active cohort aged 35-54. This means 57-59 million NEETs between 15 and 64 years of age. Taking the above into consideration, the problem of young NEETs seems to be exaggerated and/or the problem of adult NEETs seems to be neglected. Concentrating on the problem of young NEETs reflects a particular view.
Further calculations are needed to detect the long-run tendencies of adult NEET rates on the one hand and the differences between youth and adult NEET rates in member states on the other. Adult NEET rates in less developed countries are likely to be higher than those of more developed countries. The primary reason for this can be the more extended informal economy in less developed countries, but this fact is to be taken into account also in connection with the rate of young NEETs. Still, we have to underline that on an aggregate level in the EU the "disengagement" of the adult population is not meaningfully less than that of the young population.
Taking into consideration the generally high level of NEETs and unemployment, we think that in spite of the higher vulnerability of young generations, which justifies to a certain extent the special attention what they gained, the core problem is neither youth unemployment nor the young NEETs in themselves. It is total joblessness that makes increasing youth disengagement basically unsustainable. Thus, the problem of youth unemployment and young
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5. Seeking a Policy Solution and Cooperation with Civil Society: The YGS and the UBI
The YGS of the EU aims at ensuring that young people under the age of 25 are either in job or in education within four months after having left school or their last job. To this purpose, the Commission devotes EUR 8 billion in addition to the already existing EU funds between 2014 and 2020. The scheme is to be introduced by each member state in 2014.
The idea is not new in Europe as there have been similar systems for example in Finland (which was a kind of "pattern" for the initiative of the Commission) and also Austria, France, the Czech Republic, Denmark. Hungary launched its "First Job Guarantee" programme in August 2012. In Austria, the "Training Guarantee" programme was introduced in 2008 (EC 2012a, 14-15) .
There are at least three basic problems with the YGS. First, the YGS does not help NEETs between 25 and 34 years of age, the rate of whom is the highest among the younger population. Besides, neither the YGS nor other initiatives of the European Commission or the national governments are suitable for solving the long-term problem of increasing joblessness in general.
Second, the question is, what kind of education, training, job and, first of all, what perspective young people will get from the YGS or similar programmes. For example, the present Hungarian legislation concerning vocational training is in line with the YGS inasmuch as it supports vocational education in secondary schools. The crux is, however, that at the same time the government lowered compulsory school attendance age from 18 to 16 years. This measure testifies to the view nowadays prevailing that the goal of the education system is or should have to be to create a new labour force as quickly as possible for "business" i.e. to earn profit. In vocational education little or no general knowledge is taught, as there is obviously no need for that in most segments of production where "skilled" young people are to be employed. The obvious priority is the employability of the youth. Furthermore, the well-known demand of "industry" for quick and "practice oriented" education contradicts the other slogan that is frequently voiced by political and scientific circles, namely that Europe has to become a "knowledge-based society". To sum it up, a "whatsoever" type of education and training cannot satisfactorily decrease the number of NEETs in the long run.
The third problem is financing. The YGS offers 8 billion Euros for 7 years, which means 1.14 billion Euros per year for regions with levels of youth (less than 25 years of age) unemployment higher than 25%. If we presume that only half of the 7.5 million NEETs under 25 years live in such regions, we conclude that YGS offers around 2100 Euros per head of NEETs.
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According to the evaluation of 28 Swedish projects implemented between 2007 and 2012, the potential gains from measures helping young people (between 18 and 30) to reintegrate into the labour market reach 4200 Euros in the first year and 51,870 Euros per participant over five years. For this, however, Swedish authorities together with the European Social Fund have spent 7810 Euros per participant of the projects on average (EC 2012b, 13) . According to the ILO, the full integration of the younger NEETs is even more expensive. In 2010, the cost of the Swedish job guarantee programme for those between 18 and 24 years of age was close to 6000 Euros per participant. As a result, 46% of the participants had "successful outcomes". (ILO 2012, 46) This means that around 12,000 Euros were needed to help one NEET back to the labour market or education.
So, even if we take into consideration the differences between price levels in the member states and count with half of the Swedish costs only, the member states have to double the YGS from the national budgets in order to give effective help for only half of the 7.5 million 15-24-year-old European NEETs. According to the ILO (2012, 48) , implementing a young guarantee programme would cost about 21 billion Euros in the Euro zone only. There are however no additional resources, particularly in those countries where the problem is the most severe and tackling the high level of general unemployment demands also extra efforts from them.
There is another initiative that reflects a more complex approach. It stems from European civil society and aims at changing the position of wage labour in Europe, solving the problem of unemployment for good and all while liberating the proactive spirits of the society. The idea is the UBI that is neither new nor unknown in the world, but is currently applied by some rich oil countries only. The concept originated from Thomas Paine in the eighteenth century, fed the development of the welfare state until the 1980s and has been updated to the present European circumstances in the last decade (Van Parijs 2004) . The concept has been debated for a long time (see e.g. White 1997; Van Parijs 1997; Van Der Veen 1998; Tod 2008; Goedemé and Van Lancker 2009) . The essence of the idea is that every person, irrespective of age, position, profession etc, would be entitled to receive an amount that provides for a decent standard of living. (ECI 2013a (ECI , 2013b Häni and Schmidt 2013; Wortstall 2013) . The protagonists argue that in such circumstances where people are liberated from the pressure of wage labour the productivity of the society would enhance. The initiative contains a tax-reform element too. The UBI was registered as a European Citizens' Initiative in January 2013 (EC 2013) . The remit of the UBI is that, unlike the YGS, it treats the problem of the European society in its complexity, tackles the root of the problem and offers a similarly complex solution.
The UBI seems to be even more problematic than the YGS from the viewpoint of financing, elaborating the institutions and changing the society's general way of thinking. But Europe's problems, namely the growing joblessness,
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Conclusion
The problem of youth unemployment has been present in Europe for decades. Although the crisis hit youngsters badly, the unemployment of older people grew more. The share of youngsters within total unemployment is smaller now than it was 10 years ago in the majority of the less developed countries of the EU. This cannot be explained by the decreasing trend of the proportion of the youth in the total population, as the trend of RYU testifies. On the other hand, in the majority of the most developed member states the weight of youth unemployment in total tends to be higher and has increased more than in the less developed members since the beginning of the 2000s. It is the NEET-phenomenon instead of conventional youth (active) unemployment that poses a great threat to the European labour market and to the European society in general. But what is more important: the long-term problem of youth employment and the increasing rate and number of young NEETs are only the consequences of tendentially increasing total unemployment, the high rate of NEETs among adults and the increasing polarisation of society. For these problems the EU and its YGS does not offer an adequate solution.
The engine of our market economy nowadays is the imperative to be competitive and sufficiently profitable on the market. The profit motive looks for cheaper unit labour costs, and thus causes historically and tendentially increasing unemployment that inevitably leads to the rise of workless and disappointed generations. This tendency can be broken by ensuring a safe existence and participation in the society for all its members. Instead of or at least alongside the particular and old methods of curing the immediate problems only a fundamentally changed and complex view of the labour market can help. The UBI initiative of European civil society is exemplary. In the absence of such an approach, particular policies, programmes and schemes, be these ever well elaborated and financed, can only offer temporary success at best. Notes 1. Eurostat statistics by theme, unemployment rate by sex and age groups -annual average.
2. Unemployed for 12 months or more.
3. For further explanation of the NEET concept and indicator see Eurofound (2012, 20-24) . 4. Eurostat statistics by theme, participation of young people in education and training by employment status, age and sex (incl. NEET rates).
5. 17 members of the Eurozone.
6. For this reason Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli (2011) changed the denominator of youth unemployment to the population (unemployment ratio). This, however, changes the problem without solving it because by doing this, the denominator of youth unemployment rate becomes proportionally larger than the denominator of the total or adult unemployment rate. Thus the meaning of the two unemployment indicators is different again. 8. Netherlands, Belgium and to a lesser extent, Luxemburg.
9. Eurostat statistics by theme, participation rates in education by age and sex.
10. Benelux, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, UK.
11. Own calculation from data in Eurofound (2012, 76 and 79) .
12. Eurostat. Statistics by theme. Unemployment by sex and age groups -annual and monthly average, 1000 persons and unemployment rate, seasonally not adjusted data.
13. Ibid.
14. Methodology: I used the numbers of inactive people by age group and the rate of those inactive who are in education or training in the age group of 25-64. I counted those who are unemployed, their participation rate in formal or informal education by age-cohorts. The participation rates in education are given by Eurostat for 2007 and 2011 only, so I could count the rate of NEETs for the adults in these two years. From the number of inactive people I subtracted old age pensioners. Other pensioners and disabled can be in the younger NEET-generations too. The number of old age pensioners in 2011 is not given by Eurostat "Social protection/Pensions beneficiaries" statistics, so I estimated it by extrapolating the data for 2006-2010. I assumed that all people over 64 years of age are old age pensioners and that all old age pensioners are older than 54 years. This influences the rate of NEETs in the 35-54 and 55-64 age cohorts but does not change the rate of 35-64 year-old NEETs. The rates of NEETs are given by the Eurostat for the 15-34 year-old population by 5-years age groups.
